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INTRODUCTION
Since its publication, the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution [ 13] has attracted considerable attention in the economic literature. In Nash's formulation, it is assumed that the players are expected utility (EU) maximizers. Recently, Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson [ 15 ] reinterpreted Nash's bargaining problem. The ordinal Nash solution that they define is characterized by axioms that refer to the preference relations alone. Rather than specifying the Nash outcome as the one that maximizes a product of utilities, the ordinal Nash outcome is characterized as an outcome against which no player can successfully appeal. Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson examine the family of preference relations for which a unique ordinal Nash solution exists and extend the domain of the solution beyond that of EU preference relations.
Building on the above, Grant and Kajii [ 7 ] extend the family of preference relations over which the ordinal Nash solution is well defined. The "disagreement linear" (DL) preference relations that they define behave like EU on the set of elementary lotteries (lotteries whose support consists of the disagreement outcome and at most one other outcome). In a related paper, Grant and Kajii [8] further extend the set of preference relations for which
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the ordinal Nash solution exists by considering a notion of marginal boldness (see Aumann and Kurz [1] ). 2 Several other papers also deal with the ordinal Nash solution. Houba, Tieman, and Brinksma [11] characterize ordinal Nash outcomes for preference relations with separable representations over elementary lotteries; Hanany and Safra [ 10] extend the ordinal Nash solution to other sets of preference relations; Valenciano and Zarzuelo [20] analyze an asymmetric ordinal Nash solution; finally, Denicolo [6] applies the ordinal Nash solution to a different domain of bargaining problems?
Since these papers only present sufficient conditions for the existence of ordinal Nash outcomes, it is as yet unclear the extent to which the ordinal Nash solution is well defined. In this paper we suggest a solution to this problem by identifying necessao' and sufficient conditions for the existence of ordinal Nash outcomes. Then, we present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique ordinal Nash outcome. The conditions that we identify are advantageous since they refer to individual preference relations. This stands in contrast to existing alternative characterizations that are either too restrictive or that involve joint conditions, on both preference relations (in some works, conditions are even stated jointly on the preference relations and on the otttcome set).
To begin, we develop an approach that treats every bargaining problem in a way that "locally" resembles the Nash EU treatment. This is achieved by defining new functions that are referred to as "induced utilities." The induced utility of a given player measures his willingness to switch from an existing bargaining position to an alternative, whilst considering the risk of disagreement. As shown in Section 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for an outcome to be immune to appeals is that it maximizes the Nashproduct of the induced utilities, assuming the outcome itself is the existing bargaining position. In a sense, for any given bargaining position the induced utility approach creates two artificial EU players who agree with the original players in their desire to appeal against the existing outcome. If the original players are EU maximizers then the artificial EU players would be identical to them. Hence, when EU players are discussed, the induced utility approach is reduced to the classic Nash approach.
We then use the induced utility approach to characterize the set of preference relations over which the ordinal Nash outcome is well defined. Since an ordinal Nash outcome is both immune to appeals and Pareto efficient, we start by identifying conditions that refer to the former property.
In Section 3 we identify conditions on individual preference relations that are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of outcomes that are immune to appeals. In other words, we define a set of preference relations with the following property: First, an outcome that is immune to appeals exists for each couple of preference relations in the set; second, if a preference relation does not belong to the set then there exists another preference relation such that the resulting bargaining problem has no appeals immune outcome. Other necessary and sufficient conditions (and another set of preference relations) are then identified, ensuring the existence of a unique outcome that is immune to appeals.
In Section 4 we add the requirement of Pareto efficiency and identify conditions on individual preference relations that are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of ordinal Nash outcomes. This is achieved by adding a weak form of risk-aversion to the conditions of Section 3. Finally, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions lbr the existence of a unique ordinal Nash outcome.
DEFINITIONS
We consider two-player bargaining games that are characterized by elements of the tbrm (X, D, ~, ~,) where X is a set of deterministic outcomes, D is the disagreement outcome and ~; (i= 1, 2) are the players preference relations over ~:(X w {D} ), the set of simple (finite)lotteries over X w {D}. For a given D, a lottery in ff"(X w {D}) is denoted by (K, p) =(x ~ ..... x", p~ ..... p'), Y~=~ p~ 1, with the convention that p;' is the probability of x;' E X and 1 -Z~-= ,pk is the probability of D. When n = 1 and x ~D, i= 1,2, the lottery is called an elementary lottery and is denoted px. We assume that X~E+ is compact connected and fixed. Without loss of generality we consider X = { x = (-\l, -',2) ¢ R+ I.vt +-\2 ~ 1 }. 4 We also assume that D~X, where X={xEXI.\I+.\2<I}.
Denote the (relative to D) efficient frontier of X by
Since X is fixed, we do not specify it in the notation below. Hence, for example, ff:(Xu {D}) is denoted ff'(D). We also assume that, for every x ~ X, the preference relation ~z depends only on the ith coordinate .x';. A lottery /~ ffqD) can therefore be described by the pair (/~,/2) of its 4 The results of Sections 2 and 3 can be easily modified to handle the more general outcome sets. The situation is different with respect to the rest, Its of Section 4, where the definition of risk aversion explicitly utilizes the specilic linear strt, cture of the boundary of X. Given a bargaining problem <D, ~, ~z>, an outcome x is an appeal agahTst y if there exist i~{1,2} and p~[0,1] such that px>-~y while x ~j py(jvsi) (see Rubinstein, Sail'a, and Thomson). The intuition behind this definition is that, if both players perceive the probability of breakdown to be 1-p, player i is willing to take the risk of a possible breakdown when insisting on x while player.] is unwilling to do so when insisting on y. An outcome that is immune to all possible appeals can be defined as: 
Note that such conditions must involve lotteries whose total number of outcomes is unbounded. As is shown by Saffa and Segal [16] , non-EU preference relations exist that nevertheless behave like EU preferences on the set of all lotteries with n outcomes at most. Therefore, the cardinal convexity assumption introduced by Grant and Kajii [7] (for all x #y ¢ X there exists zeX such that for each i:pB~xAqB~iy~z~ ~(p+q) B~, where B; is ith best outcome in X) may sometimes not be sufficiently strong to ensure the equality F
(D, ~1, ~z)=F(D).
We now turn to the main new definition of this paper--that of induced utilities. Given a bargaining problem (D, ~>t, ~2>, let ¢/dDi) be the set of all continuous functions u~: {xsX]x ~>D}~x {xeXlx >D}~--* ~+ that increase in their first argument, decrease in the second, satisfy udt; t)= 1, udD;; t)=0 and uds; t)ui(t;s)= 1. 
IU d ~;)(s;t)= if t~ips
The function ui= IUd ~) is the induced utility of ~;.
It is easy to see that the induced utilities u;, whenever they are well defined, satisfy:
Therefore, if the second arguments are taken as reference points and only elementary lotteries are considered, the induced utilities locally behave like vNM utilities of some EU preference relations that are in agreement with the given preferences.
EXAMPLE 2.4. (1) EU preference rehttions. If ~; is an EU preference relation with a vNM utility function v~ then u~(x~; )'~)--(t,~(x~)-v~(D~))/ (r~(yi)-e~(D~)).
It is straightforward to see that, qualitatively speaking, the induced utilities of an EU preference are independent of the reference point y and of the disagreement outcome D.
(2) Multiplicatit~ely separahle preferences relations. According to these preference relations, the utility value of an elementary lottery p.v~ to a player with a preference relation ~; is given by gi(P) v~(x~) + (1 -g~(p)) t,~(D~), where g/: [0, 1 ] --, [0, 1 ] is increasing and onto and t'~: [0, 1 ] ~ [~ is increasing. The probability transformation function g; is uniquely determined while the utility function l,~ is unique up to affine transformations. EU preference relations belong to this set (there, g~(p)= p). The set of DL preferences, introduced by Grant and Kajii [7] , is a subset of this set, too; it contains non-EU preferences for which g~(p)=p while the independence axiom does not hold for some non-elementary lotteries. Another non-EU family that is a subset of this set is the family of rank-dependent utility (RDU) preference relations (see Quiggin [ 14] and Weymark [21 ] ). The value that an RDU preference relation ~ associates with a lottery / is given by
where Fr is the cumulative distribution function of/. Another non-EU family that is a subset of the set of multiplicatively separable preferences is Gul's [9] disappointment aversion (DA) family. The value that a DA preference relation ~i associates with a lottery / is given by where c;(/)~/ is the certainty equivalent of/, ~ is the probability that / yields an outcome above its certainty equivalent and 7(~)= ~/(1 +(1 -0~)[-¢t) for some n umber/~';. Clearly, g~ The properties of the induced utilities will now be exploited in order to characterize appeals-immune outcomes in a parallel manner to that of Nash outcomes. Consider a given bargaining problem (D, ~, ~_,>. Define a correspondence & {xCXlx>D} --*2 x by 8(y)=arg .~¢xmaX { ,l~! u~(x~; y~) ) .
That is, d(y) is the Nash outcome of the Nash utility bargaining problem where the induced utilities substitute for the vNM utilities, and nonelementary lotteries are not considered. Note that the correspondence ~5 is well defined. The following proposition makes use of this analogy. 
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF APPEALS-IMMUNE OUTCOMES
Let D e X and restrict attention to elementary lotteries. We say that a preference relation ~ ~.¢(D~) is smooth if it has a utility representation (with the arguments p and x;) that is twice differentiable and has positive partial derivatives on the subset {lx]x>D} of degenerate elementary lotteries. The set of elementary lotteries for D = (0, 0) is displayed in Fig. 2 . Let .¢'~'"(D~) be the set of all smooth preferences in .¢(D~). If ~ ~.¢'~'"(D~) then the partial derivatives of the induced utility u~ at (l; t) are well defined, as well as the second partial derivatives fi'om either the left or the right of (1; t). Hence, for all t~ R++, (O/cOs)u,.(s;/)l,, is well defined, finite, positive, bounded away from 0 and differentiable. Let u'At; t) denote this partial derivative. Assuming t'~(D~) = 0, for EU preference relations u'
i(t; t ) = v'A t)/ vat) and for multiplicatively separable preference relations u'At;t)= v'~(t)/(g'~(1) v~(t)).
Clearly .#~m(D,-) includes all EU preference relations with twice-differentiable vNM utilities that have positive derivative and hence is not empty. Note that the partial derivative u'(t; t) is the absolute value of the slope of the player's indifference curve at the degenerate lottery I t (see Fig. 2 ).
The following lemma provides a necessary condition for an outcome y* to be an appeals-immune outcome of the bargaining problem (D, ~, ~2)- .,( y*-y.*)] =.'~(yT; y*)-u_~It_~ ;y*). I
( i ) Existence o[ Appeals-hmmuw Outcomes
The next theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of at least one appeals-immune outcome in X. The theorem characterizes a set of preference relations with the property that an appeals-immune outcome exists for each couple of preference relations in the set. On the other hand, if a preference relation does not belong to the set then there exists another preference relation, that can even be chosen from the set, such that the resulting bargaining problem has no appeals-immune out- which implies that y* is an appeals-immune outcome.
(2) See Appendix. 1
Condition (El) is natural since it is equivalent to satisfying a form of first-order stochastic-dominance near the degenerate lottery that yields D; with certainty. It can be examined easily in a graphical representation as in Fig. 2 , where it is satisfied if indifference curves near (0, 1 ) are almost vertical. For EU preference relations, (El) is satisfied if v';(D;)> 0. The intuition behind condition (E2) is that an upper bound on the induced utility functions ensures that appeals are more difficult to conduct. As in part (1) of the proof above, condition (E2) guarantees that no appeals can be made against the point y*, where marginal utilities are equal, since the product of the induced utilities does not exceed one.
Remark. Consider an EU preference relation ~/with a twice-differentiable vNM utility function vi that has a positive derivative. It follows that log-concavity of vi is necessary and sufficient to ensure that ~; belongs to .¢e(D;). Clearly, concavity of the vNM utility function is a sufficient condition for log-concavity. For convex functions, log-concavity is satisfied as long as the (Arrow-Pratt) measure of risk loving, v~'(yi)/v';(y~), is bounded from above by v'd)'i)/vdyi). Next consider an RDU preference relation ~;
with Ui(Xi)taxi, as in Yaari's dual theory [22] . Condition (E2)is stated for such a preference by is a necessary and sufficient condition on gi(P) that enstires ~; E.#U(D i) (see Fig. 3 ).
We now present an example of a bargaining problem with two well behaved players (one with a RDU preference relation and the other with an EU preference relation) for which there is no appeals-immune outcome. The example demonstrates the role of condition (E2) in the characterization of the set .#r-'(Di). (
ii) Uniqueness ~!/" Appeals-hmmme Outcomes
We now present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique appeals-immune outcome. Similarly to Theorem 3.2, the next theorem characterizes a set of preference relations with the property that a unique appeals-inamune outcome exists for each couple of preference relations in the set. Moreover, if a preference relation does not belong to the set then there exists another preference relation, that can even be chosen fi'om the closure of the set, such that the bargaining problem either has multiple appeals-immune outcomes or none at all. In fact, relative to the set of preference relations that satisfy condition (E2) (=(U2)), .~;(D~) is the interior of .~(D;). In this sense, "almost all" bargaining problems have a unique appeals-immune outcome. Also note that the set of preference relations that is given by the set of conditions {(El), strict (E2)}, where "strict (E2)" is derived from (E2) requiring a strict inequality, cannot replace the set .
¢C'(D~) (since this set is a proper subset of .¢V(D~)).
Remark. It is easy to see that the former two theorems can be immediately extended to cases in which the outcome set is given by and is therefore an appeals-immune outcome. 
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF ORDINAL NASH OUTCOMES
As in the last part of Section 3, the conditions derived below are independent of the disagreement outcome. Let .',:" be defined by . We conclude this section with a detailed example that characterizes the intersections of familiar sets of preference relations with the set .~uc~/J'". EXAMPLE 4.3. (l) EU preferences relations. As noted above, the intersection of .,:u¢~//,.~ with this set consists of all EU preference relations with concave, strictly increasing and twice-differentiable vNM utility functions.
(2) RDU pr~/'erence rekttions. We restrict attention to preference relations with twice differentiable utility function l' that has a positive derivative and with strictly increasing g satisfying g'( 1 ) 4 = 0. These preference relations belong to .~u if l' is strictly log-concave and if For RDU preference relations to display risk-aversion with respect to mean-preserving spreads, it is necessary and sufficient that both v and -g are concave (see Chew, Karni, and Safra [5] ). Our weaker notion of riskaversion does not require the concavity of v (see Chateauneuf and Cohen I-3]). A characterization of a set of preference relations that displays an intermediate notion of risk-aversion (monotone risk-aversion) appears in Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson [4] . Hence, adding the conditions of this paper to those required for ::u gives a set of RDU preference relations that is included in .~uc~,¢"~.
Detecting the inclusion in the set .:u becomes easier for RDU preference relations with a function g of the form g(p)= p~, • > 0. This is the case since these preference relations belong to the class DL and hence they belong to ~:u if, and only if, t, is strictly log-concave.
A complete characterization of the set ::u~.:,, for the set of RDU preference relations with linear utility (Yaari' Interestingly, the same characterization holds for RDU preference relations with utility functions of the form v(x)=x ~, 0 <~< 1. Deriving the conditions on .¢u is rather complicated and hence omitted. Risk-aversion, on the other hand, is easy to detect. Since all utility functions are concave, our notion of risk-aversion is still characterized by the equation g(p)~< p.
(3) DA pre[erence relations. As before, we restrict attention to preference relations with twice differentiable utility function v that has positive derivative. By monotonicity with respect to the relation of firstorder stochastic-dominance, fl > -1. These preference relations belong to .¢u if r is strictly log-concave and if Clearly, u2(x2; 3'2) is log-concave and therefore, (E2) is satisfied. 6 Thus, player 2 satisfies all the required properties, ~2 e.¢E(D2) and the bargaining problem (D, ~,, ~2) has no appeals-immune outcomes. Now assume that (El) is satisfied while (E2) is not. Consider two possible cases: (Case 1) the function u't(y,; y t) is monotonically non-increasing in l'l on F,(D)\{DI} and (Case2) the function u'l(yl;y I) is somewhere increasing in y~. and ' '" ,_ u2(.r_,, Y2) =h(v~). By Lemma 2.5, ~2 can be extended to Y~(D). Now, by construction, p(x 2 --D2)=0 then px ~2 D and (3) for all other lotteries ~2 is defined as an extension satisfying all the properties required from preference relations in .¢(D) and such that the slopes of its indifference curves at lotteries of the form ly are equal to -h(y2). Monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic-donainance is assured by the way the function 4~ was constructed. By construction, the induced utility /.i 2 satisfies u2(w2; w~)=e h~"'~)"'~ .... 9 and t4(w2; w 2) =h(w2). The proof concludes similarly to the proof of the former case. where lim~_ o 4~(e) = 0. Hence, for small e > 0, u,(w l" w~) > u=( w2: w~) and w' is as an appeal against w 2. According to Lemma 3.1, no appeals-immune outcome exists. ~ (': ,)a, = el, -.,~* ,.t -1)a,   =e~;; h(.,.)ds_~, , ,, 
Proof of Theorem

